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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE BUCKLEY AMENDMENT:
OPENING SCHOOL FILES FOR STUDENT AND
PARENTAL REVIEW
With the rapid development in the 1960's of electronic means of gathering
and storing information, one of mankind's oldest activities, that of record-
keeping, came under increasing scrutiny from legislative tribunals, individ-
uals, and, all too infrequently, the courts. A desire to strike a workable bal-
ance between personal privacy and institutional recordkeeping prompted
numerous foundation studies' and, last year, extensive congressional hearings
which resulted in enactment of legislation pertaining to "freedom of informa-
tion"'2 and the broad concept of individual privacy.3
In contrast, the most recent addition to this area was a controversial and
hastily contrived piece of legislation known as the "Buckley Amendment ' 4
for its sponsor, Senator James L. Buckley of New York. Intended primarily
to open up individual school files for student and parental review, 5 the mea-
l. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF THE SCIENCES, DATA BANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY
(1972); RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE COLLECTION, MAINTENANCE
AND DISSEMINATION OF PUPIL RECORDS (1970). The National Academy project,
a scholarly and well detailed analysis of the effects of computerization on recordkeeping
and the right to privacy, concludes that increased computer usage (1) has not resulted
in overly expansive powers of surveillance; (2) can indeed prove beneficial in systems
efficiency; but (3) has not resulted in a correlative expansion of organizational policies
affecting the individual rights involved. Id. at 341.
2. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5758 (Dec. 15, 1974)).
3. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat, 1896 (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6881 (Jan. 30, 1975)). See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 93RD CONG., 2D SESS., MATERIALS PERTAINING TO S.3418 AND
PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN FEDERAL GATHERING, USE AND DISCLOSURE OF IN-
FORMATION (Comm. Print 1974). See also Joint Hearings on S.3418, S.3633, S.3116,
S.2810, S.2542 Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Privacy and Information Systems of
the Senate Comm. on Government Operations and the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
4. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g (Supp.
1975).
5. Because legislative hearings were not held on the measure, an understanding of
the intent is best derived from floor discussion in the Senate. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC.
The Buckley Amendment
sure was adopted in May 1974 by voice vote in the Senate as an amendment
to an omnibus education bill. 6 The legislation subsequently caused an uproar
among educators sufficient to bring about the proposal and passage of new,
corrective legislation only one month after its effective date of November 19,
1974.1 This corrective legislation is now in effect.
As a whole, the current measure is largely duplicative of the original. Par-
ents and students may review information maintained in a student's educa-
tional file; they may challenge such information if they believe it to be false
or misleading; and there exist strict controls on the accessibility of a student's
records to third parties. Particularly significant, however, is the new provi-
sion that students may waive their future rights of access to certain confiden-
tial information; this provision can effectively close up many of the files
which the original Buckley Amendment intended to open. The evolution
and possible ramifications of this waiver provision are discussed below.
Despite the new measure's partial frustration of original congressional in-
tent, it is nevertheless clear that the merger of an increased national concern
for individual privacy with a growing conception of the student as a citizen
entitled to ordinary constitutional guarantees has produced a certain ensured
dynamism in the area of educational recordkeeping.
I. THE STUDENT/SCHOOL RELATIONSHIP: AN AREA OF CHANGE
Transferral of legislative guarantees of privacy into the context of educa-
tional recordkeeping necessarily involves an examination of the judicially
fashioned in loco parentis relationship of students and schools. Developed
during the 19th and early 20th centuries, largely in response to frequent liti-
gation brought against teachers who punished their students, 8 the doctrine de-
fined the position of teachers and school administrators as standing in loco
parentis to their pupils.9
21,484 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1974) (remarks of Senator McIntyre); 120 CONG. REC. 21,
487-489 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1974) (remarks of Senator Buckley).
6. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484 (U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3071 (Oct. 15, 1974) (codified in scattered
sections of 20 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1975)).
7. White House Conference-Library and Information Services, Pub. L. No. 93-568,
§ 2, 88 Stat. 1855 (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6836-42 (Jan.
30, 1975)).
8. See Note, Private Government on the Campus-Judicial Review of University
Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963). Another good analysis of the in loco parentis
doctrine, as well as a study of the application of due process and equal protection to
the relations of students and institutions of higher learning, is provided in Beaney, Stu-
dents, Higher Education, and the Law, 45 DENVER L.J. 511 (1968). See also Develop-
ments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045 (1968).
9. Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913), is often cited as a
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Although in many instances courts during this period found that educa-
tional authority derived from the general enabling act of an educational insti-
tution or school district, 10 the examples of courts relying broadly on the in
loco parentis doctrine, and thus neglecting the larger constitutional issues, are
legion." The latter, traditional, approach is rooted in Blackstone:
[The parent] may also delegate part of his parental authority, dur-
ing his life, to the tutor or school master of his child; who is then
in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent
committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as
may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is em-
ployed.12
It may be questioned whether the voluntary nature of Blackstone's envisaged
delegation of authority is of any relevance in contemporary public education,
which is compulsory in nature. With few exceptions," s however, the courts
ignored this distinction and utilized the in loco parentis doctrine to vest broad
discretionary authority in educational officials. 14
The doctrine was strengthened in 1934, when the Supreme Court postu-
lated that attendance at public universities is a privilege and not a right. 5
As a result, judicial parameters for the activities of school authorities were
infrequently drawn. Moreover, school teachers and administrators were af-
forded the somewhat lenient yardstick of "reasonableness" on those few oc-
casions when their in-school activities were challenged in the courts. Thus,
in a representative case in 1955, the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that
the "only concern of the courts is to determine whether the school rules and
regulations are reasonable or. .. arbitrary." 1
touchstone for the doctrine. Further discussion of the doctrine is found in Buss, Pro-
cedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U.
PA. L. REV. 547, 559-62 (1971).
10. See, e.g., Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923); Board of
Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967); Jones v. Cody, 132 Mich.
13, 92 N.W. 495 (1902); State ex rel. Thompson v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 202
Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57 (1957).
11. See, e.g., Kenny v. Gurley, 208 Ala. 623, 95 So. 34 (1923); Holmes v. State, 39
So. 569 (Ala. 1905); Isgrig v. Srygley, 210 Ark. 580, 197 S.W.2d 39 (1946); Douglas
v. Campbell, 89 Ark. 254, 116 S.W. 211 (1909); John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla.
510, 102 So. 637 (1924); Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924);
Vermillion v. State ex rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907); State v. Lutz,
113 N.E.2d 757 (Ohio C.P. 1953).
12. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *453.
13. See, e.g., Drake v. Thomas, 310 Ill. App. 57, 33 N.E.2d 889 (1941); Anthony
v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928).
14. See cases cited note 11 supra.
15. See Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
16. Casey County Bd. of Educ. v. Luster, 282 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Ky. 1955). The
.[Vol. 24:588
The Buckley Amendment
A. In Loco Parentis Doctrine Comes Under Attack
In a landmark decision in 1967, the Supreme Court provided impetus for
new analyses of traditional legal attitudes toward young people when, in In
Re Gault,17 it extended hitherto withheld procedural guarantees to juvenile
court proceedings. Significantly, in rejecting the theory that a state acting
as parens patriae could disregard due process guarantees for juveniles, the
Court stated that "[tihe Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who
sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme;
but its meaning is murky and its historical credentials are of dubious rele-
vance."' 8  Although one must exercise caution in drawing an analogy be-
tween Gault and other areas in which rights are extended to minors, 19 the
Court's obvious disenchantment with reliance on an overly expansive legal
doctrine which sanctioned broad, and potentially harmful authority over juve-
niles is of relevance in the in loco parentis context.
A sporadic, though cumulatively persuasive attack on the in loco parentis
doctrine was evinced by other cases. For example, in 1961, the Fifth Circuit
completely circumvented application of the doctrine in an expulsion case by
treating a public college as a governmental body analogous to an administra-
tive agency. 20 Similarly, in a decision that provided another striking contrast
to the Supreme Court's earlier characterization of attendance at a public uni-
versity as a privilege, a California court likened attendance at institutions of
higher learning to public employment. 21 -On the secondary level, in Tinker
v. Des Moines School District,2 2 the Supreme Court expanded Gault's exten-
sion of constitutional guarantees to juveniles by holding that state operated
schools cannot be "enclaves of totalitarianism"' 23 in the observance of the first
amendment freedoms of students. The Tinker decision, though not to be
viewed as sounding the death knell for the in loco parentis doctrine,24 none-
court held that a principal's rule prohibiting schoolchildren from entering or patronizing
a nearby cafe was not unreasonable or arbitrary, but rather for the good of the children.
17. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
18. Id. at 16.
19. See Buss, supra note 9, at 557-58, for a discussion of the limiting considerations.
20. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961).
21. See Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57
Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
22. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
23. Id. at 511. The Court continued, "School officials do not possess absolute au-
thority over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' un-
der our Constitution." Id.
24. See, e.g., Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970), in which the court
ruled that a school board could, consistent with due process, enforce regulations regard-
ing the hair length of male students. See also Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D.
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theless illustrated an important shift in the judicial conception of the relation-
ship between student and school.
In retrospect, the most significant (and paradoxical) aspect of the growth
of the doctrine is that this judicially created relationship fostered ultimate ju-
dicial deference to the administrative decisions of educational institutions.
This tacit desire to uphold autonomous institutional authority was responsible,
in turn, for the relative dearth of litigation in the area of educational record-
keeping. Only when it was recognized that the mere condition of being a
student is not sufficient to deny constitutional guarantees could the stalemate
be broken. With additional fuel flowing from the intense national interest
in personal privacy, the stage was set for litigation and, in the form of the
Buckley Amendment, legislation.
B. Judicial Reticence and Variegated State Law
Despite the growing extrajudicial interest, however, an indication that the
Supreme Court might maintain a somewhat passive attitude toward educa-
tional recordkeeping was offered in 1971 when, in State of Washington ex
rel. Tarver v. Smith,25 the Court denied certiorari to a Washington woman
who wished to challenge material placed in a file maintained on her as a
welfare recipient under the Federal Aid to Families and Dependent Children
program. A caseworker had placed allegedly derogatory material in the
woman's file, accusing her of child neglect and recommending that she be
deprived of custody of her children. Although it would be improvident to
interpret the Court's refusal to grant certiorari in Tarver as an absolute un-
willingness to explore the constitutional ramifications of institutional record-
keeping, it is safe to assume that the volume of litigation in this area will
not show a dramatic or sudden increase.
Similarly, the sporadic lower court rulings on access to recordkeeping sys-
tems, particularly those of educational institutions, do not provide forceful
guidance in attempting to discern a definitive trend. A New York case, Van
Allen v. McLeary,26 is nevertheless worthy of mention for its recognition of
what the court perceived to be a common law right of a parent to inspect
his child's records. Regarding the parent/school relationship as essentially
a compulsory one in which a parent must delegate educational authority over
his child to the school, the court relied on "the obvious 'interest' which a
La. 1967), afi'd per curiam, 408 F.2d 108.5 (5th Cir. 1969); Leonard v. School Comm.,
349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965). But see Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60
(M.D. Ala. 1969).
25. 78 Wash. 2d 152, 470 P.2d 172 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1000 (1971).
26. 27 Misc. 2d 81, 211 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
,[Vol. 24:588
The Buckley Amendment
parent has in the school records" 27 as determinative of his rights. (It is inter-
esting to note that the court offered a contemporary interpretation of Black-
stone's view of the in loco parentis doctrine by reverting to common law
tenets.)
In a slightly different context, an effort to enjoin public inspection of par-
ticular school records of a university student proved unsuccessful. In Eisen
v. Regents of the University of California,28 a California court held that the
public's right to obtain disclosure of the names of officers and the stated pur-
poses of registered student organizations outweighed what the court charac-
terized as a "minimal" infringement of the first amendment freedoms of the
officers of the organization. The "public records doctrine" 29 came into play
in this and similar cases. Briefly, the doctrine is based upon the supposition
that in a democratic society, public records should be open to anyone who
shows a legitimate interest in viewing them. 0 However, since some states
specifically exempt certain documents, 31 access even to those documents
which appear to fall well within the ambit of the doctrine may nevertheless
be limited.
Some guidelines for educational recordkeeping have existed since the early
1970's. Over twenty-five states have laws or regulations regarding student
records,3 2 though they vary widely in force and content. Although most of
these states permit parental or student access to files under certain conditions,
27. Id. at 92, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
28. 269 Cal. App. 2d 696, 75 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1969).
29. Although the doctrine relied on judicial precedent during its gestation and earli-
est development, nearly every state now has a statute concerning access to public records.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-19 (1969), which states in part:
Except as otherwise provided by any federal or state statute or regulation,
all records made, maintained or kept on file by any executive, administrative,
legislative or judicial body, agency, commission or official of the state, or any
political subdivision thereof ...shall be public records and every resident of
the state shall have the right to inspect or copy such records at such reasonable
time as may be determined by the custodian thereof ...
30. "Legitimate interest" involves more than a peripheral concern with the subject
matter. Thus, in State v. Harrison, 130 W. Va. 246, 250, 43 S.E.2d 214, 218 (1947),
a West Virginia court stated, "There is no right of inspection of a public record when
the inspection is sought to satisfy a person's mere whim or fancy . . . or to further any
improper end or purpose."
31. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-209 (1969), exempting certain student
health records from the doctrine.
32. These states do not fall into a geographical, or other, pattern. A recent com-
pilation of all relevant state laws is provided in NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR CrrIzENS
IN EDUCATION, CHILDREN, PARENTS AND SCHOOL RECORDS (1974). An organization
founded to research and publicize the problems of confidentiality of student records, the
National Committee for Citizens in Education (NCCE) was a prime instigator of the
Buckley Amendment. See note 38 infra.
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until enactment of the Buckley Amendment only four permitted parents to
correct, expunge, or challenge the contents of records they felt to be inaccu-
rate.A3  One commentator felt that such heterogeneity may not be "as such
undesirable, if it reflects genuine differences in outlooks and values among
states or school districts. '' . 4  But he went on to state that it is "plain that
in many districts and for many purposes the issues presented by pupils' school
records have been resolved ad hoc and even ad hominum, without pretence
of any systematic examination of the pertinent interests. 35
The extreme variance in the content of state statutes produced, as might
be expected, a curious mixture of procedural results. One extensive study,
conducted in fifty-four representative school districts, showed that in only
fifteen districts did pupils have access to their entire files, and that parents
had complete access to their children's files in only twenty districts. At the
same time, however, twenty-nine districts offered complete access to CIA and
FBI officials, twenty-three to juvenile authorities, and twenty-one to health
department officials.36
II. A LEGISLATIVE Focus ON THE STUDENT/SCHOOL RELATIONSHIP
Passage of the Buckley Amendment and subsequent corrective legislation
offers a classic case study of infrequently publicized steps in the familiar
process of "how a bill becomes a law."'3 7 No legislative hearings were held
to explore potential problems of, or reactions to, the subject matter; nor does
it appear that there was extensive preparation on the part of the Senators
who cosponsored the bill.38
33. See Indiana's Recommended Guidelines for Pupil Records (1973), Minne-
sota's Guidelines for the Collection, Maintenance, and Release of Pupil Records
(1973), New York's Manual on Pupil Records (1965), and Pennsylvania's School Law
Information Exchange (April 1973), as reported in NATIONAL COMMITrEE FOR CITIZENS
IN EDUCATION, CHILDREN, PARENTS AND SCHOOL RECORDS (1974).
34. C. Lister, Privacy, Recordkeeping and the Public Schools, June, 1974, at 5 (un-
published article in author's possession). Mr. Lister served on the National Acad-
emy of the Sciences project, supra note 1.
35. Id.
36. See Goslin & Bordier, Recordkeeping in Elementary and Secondary Schools, in
S. WHEELER, ON RECORD: FILES AND DOSSIERS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 29 (1969).
37. See 120 CONG. Rac. 7533 (daily ed. May 9, 1974).
38. Senator Buckley, although long actively involved in the educational field, asked
an aide to draft legislation little more than one month before its introduction. The chief
protagonist for the "instant legislation" was Diane Divocky, who had detailed numerous
abuses in school recordkeeping systems in an article entitled "How Secret School Records
Can Hurt Your Child" in Parade Magazine, March 31, 1974. See Wentworth, Changes
Sought to Law on Student File Inspection, Washington Post, Dec. 9, 1974, § A, at 2,
col. 1. Ms. Divocky serves on the Advisory Panel of the NCCE.
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Nonetheless, court decisions in the area of educational recordkeeping, al-
though infrequent and inconsistent, taken together with the foundation
studies, 39 had already raised many of the pertinent questions. These in-
cluded the basic consideration of a right to access, the additional problem
of the kind of information which should be maintained in a student file, and
the ancillary, but procedurally crucial, question of challenging allegedly false
information.
As originally enacted, the Buckley Amendment provided for the with-
drawal of federal funds from any educational institution which denied
parental or, under certain circumstances, student access 40 to all official
records, files and data related to the student.41 Along with the right to re-
view and inspect such information, the parties were to have the opportunity
to challenge at a hearing any information they believed inaccurate or mis-
leading.42 Finally, educational institutions were required, with certain excep-
tions, to withhold personally identifiable records from third parties unless the
information was released by written consent of the parent or student, 43 or
issued in compliance with a judicial order or subpoena.4 4 The Secretary of
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was given the appropriate
enforcement power, and was instructed to establish an office and review
board within the Department to investigate alleged violations of the law.4 5
Utilizing the withdrawal of federal funding as a sanction in the enforce-
ment of legislation such as the Buckley Amendment raises some interesting
considerations. Agencies often enjoy large discretionary power in adminis-
tering their programs.4 6 Affording an agency leeway in setting standards of
39. See note 1 supra.
40. Student access is limited to students who are over eighteen years of age or in
attendance at a postsecondary institution. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(d) (Supp. 1975).
41. See id. § 1232g(a)(1).
42. See id. § 1232g(a)(2).
43. See id. § 1232g(b) (1). Third parties falling within the exceptions to this pro-
scription include other school officials within the student's educational institution or lo-
cal educational agency who have "legitimate educational interests"; school officials in
another school or school system in which the student seeks to enroll; and persons con-
nected with a student's application for financial aid.
44. Before compliance with a judicial order or subpoena, school authorities are re-
quired to notify the parents and student of the orders. See id. § 1232g(b) (2)(B). Pre-
sumably, false information could be discovered before causing extensive damage.
45. See id. § 1232g(g). An additional congressional concern over the merger of
privacy rights with educational data keeping was indicated in § 1232g(c) which calls
for regulations safeguarding the use, dissemination and protection of school data by a
governmental agency.
46. See generally Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies,
5 HAiv. Civ. RsIGrs-Csv. LIB. L. REV. 1 (1970); Skoler, Lynch & Axilbund, Legal and
Quasi-Legal Considerations in New Federal Aid Programs, 56 GEo. L.J. 1144 (1968).
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eligibility for federal funds compounds those delays in administrative ma-
chinery which prompted Justice Friendly to observe: "To borrow Mr.
Churchill's phrase, the regulatory agencies often tolerate delays up with which
the judiciary would not put."'47 Of note, then, is the possibility that the
Buckley Amendment might not be strictly construed or promptly enforced by
HEW.48
The original amendment was signed into law by President Ford in August
1974, with an effective date of November 19, 1974. However, as adminis-
trators and teachers in institutions of higher education became aware of cer-
tain provisions in the law, they set into operation a well-coordinated, intense
lobbying effort to delay its implementation. 49 Their concern was presumably
fostered by the Act's provision that at age eighteen, or upon entering a post-
secondary institution, a student assumes the sole right of access to his file. °
This provision raised numerous considerations, among them the very difficult
problem of what to do with letters of recommendation written for students
prior to their entrance to a college or university, under the assurance of confi-
dentiality for the writer.
A. A Brief Study in the Influence of Interest Groups on the
Legislative Process
In a memorandum to its member institutions in early October 1974, a na-
tional postsecondary educational association urged that each institution lobby
its congressional representatives for a delay in implementation of the Act. 51
Positing that the law "could undermine many areas of vital confidentiality, '5 2
the association raised the possibility of holding hearings to deal with antici-
pated problems, for the purpose of heading off what it foresaw as a "massive
47. H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 68 (1967).
48. But cf. Fisher, The Carrot and the Stick: Conditions for Federal Assistance, 6
HARV. J. LaEjis. 401 (1969), in which the author suggested that strict "assistance propor-
tionate to performance" from administrative agencies might be a mistake. Instead, the
author contended that "a great deal of time must be spent on explaining to the recipients
the general principle which the specific deficiency in performance brings into play." Id.
at 405.
49. In contrast, student groups seemed pleased with the provisions of the new law.
Kathy Kelly, President of the United States Student Association, noted that the amend-
ment "provides a long overdue mechanism for correcting misinformation and errors in
students' records which may be vital to their careers," and expressed the belief that the
measure would "curb the arbitrary power that has so often been misused by school ad-
ministrators and agencies allowed easy access to students' records." United States Na-
tional Student Association Press Release (Nov. 14, 1974).
50. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(d) (Supp. 1975).
51. The author of the memorandum, dated October 28, 1974, has requested that con-
fidentiality be maintained.
52. Id. at 1.
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number of lawsuits" 53 if the law were to be enforced as enacted. These
themes were reiterated in letters sent to members of Congress, as requested,
by the recipients of the memo. 54 Interestingly, neither the original memo
nor the resultant letters explained the basis for their forecast that lawsuits
would be generated as a result of enforcement.
All members of the House Committee on Education and Labor and the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare received communications
from ad hoc groups of administrators throughout October and November
1974. The American Council on Education, along with five other national
groups, 55 urged delay of implementation, citing problems with confidentiality
of letters of recommendation, certain "ambiguities" 56 in the Act, and "conse-
quences that the Congress may not have intended. ' 57 On November 15, the
deans of six law schools urged members of the appropriate committees to sup-
port a delay of the effective date and called for hearings to consider corrective
legislation.58 The Association of American Medical Colleges also urged post-
ponement of implementation. 59
While lobbying efforts intensified, colleges were, for the most part, prepar-
ing to comply with the Act. 60 In a widely distributed memorandum, 61 the
53. Id. at 2.
54. Letters were sent to, among others, Senators Kennedy and Metcalf, Representa-
tives Mosher and Teague, and the entire Illinois, Virginia, Wisconsin and Alabama con-
gressional delegations. The source of this information has requested that the authors
not be named.
55. The American Association of Community and Junior Colleges, the National As-
sociation of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, the Association of American
Colleges, the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, and the Associa-
tion of American Universities.
56. American Council on Education, Memorandum to Members of the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare, and the House Committee on Education and Labor,
at 1, Oct. 8, 1974. Among the "important ambiguities" which the signers noted was
a reference in the Act to subsections numbered incorrectly. The signers asked for clar-
ification of the term "any and all official records, files and data" and raised questions
concerning the hearing mechanism. Id. at 2.
57. The authors perceived these consequences to be the viewing by the student of
confidential financial statements submitted by his parents, and the possibility of student
access to psychiatric records. Another concern was that parents of students over age
eighteen or in attendance at postsecondary institutions could not see their children's files
without the latter's consent. Id. at 1.
58. Letter from the deans of the law schools at Columbia, Harvard, Stanford, Yale,
the University of Chicago, and the University of Pennsylvania to members of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and the House Committee on Education and
Labor, November 15, 1974.
59. Letter from John Cooper, President of the Association of American Medical Col-
leges, to members of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and the House
Committee on Education and Labor, November 22, 1974.
60. Some schools (e.g., Harvard) sent original letters of recommendation back to
19751
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Chancellor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology issued a policy state-
ment which maintained that materials received under an assurance of confi-
dentiality prior to November 19, 1974 (the effective date of the Act) would
not be reviewable by a student without the author's written consent8 2
Although educational authorities raised a plethora of considerations in
their lobbying efforts, it was evident that the focal issue was that of the confi-
dentiality of letters of recommendation. In a memorandum answering the
objections raised by the educators, the Buckley aide who drafted the original
legislation distinguished this area as the "one largely reasonable concern. '63
However, to the suggestion that confidential recommendations are "unlikely
to be candid and frank" 64 and might result in bland and useless letters if ac-
cessible to the subject, he raised some important questions:
[S]urely the average admissions officer can distinguish between a
bland letter which says essentially nothing and an enthusiastic or
detailed letter which has something of value to say. Even in terms
of negative comments, are we wrong assuming that most teachers
would have the moral courage of their convictions to say what they
believe, even in the face of disclosure to the individual in question?
Or is it that they have often been too loose with their comments,
too generous with their personal prejudices and too sparing with
their objectiveity [sic]?65
Philosophical considerations notwithstanding, the educational lobbyists
won a partial victory when, on November 14, 1974, one of the cosponsors
their authors, some (e.g., the University of Pennsylvania) put the letters in storage, and
some (e.g., Georgetown) took advantage of the "grace period" which permits schools
to take up to forty-five days to produce requested files. See Wentworth, Unlocking
School Files: The Buckley Amendment, Washington Post, November 17, 1974, § C, at
5, col. 4. Harvard's legal counsel commented:
I think this is the most disturbing piece of legislation affecting higher educa-
tion that has come out of Congress in recent years. There were no opportuni-
ties for students, faculty, administrators, or other university officials to be
heard on problems that directly affect them .... At Harvard, we have been
trying to figure out how we will come in compliance, and I don't think we are
going to make it by November 19. No one should be put in this position in
our society, where he can't comply with laws.
Address by Daniel Steiner, 1974 College Board National Forum, Oct. 27, 1974.
61. Paul E. Gray, Initial Statement of Institute Policy Concerning Access to Student
Records and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Nov. 15, 1974.
62. M.I.T. was one of the first postsecondary institutions in the country to compu-
terize its recordkeeping system. See National Academy of the Sciences project, supra
note 1, at 169-82.
63. Memorandum from John Kwapisz, aide to Senator James Buckley, Questions
About and Objections to the Buckley Amendment-and Responses, at 1, Fall 1974.
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id. at 5.
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of the original measure issued a statement that if an "agreement" could not
be worked out, he would "in all probability sponsor an amendment to defer
the effective date of the Buckley Amendment." 8
B. Waiver of Absolute Access
New legislation was introduced shortly before the end of the 93d Con-
gress, and like its progenitor, the corrective measure was attached to a
bill on the floor of the Senate.67 This time the vehicle was a House-passed
resolution authorizing a 1977 White House conference on libraries and infor-
mation services. Cosponsored by Senators Buckley and Pell, and signed by
the President on December 31, 1974, the new law includes much of the
original statutory language, with several significant additions:
(1) Students are barred from viewing letters of recommendation
written prior to January 1, 1975 ;68
(2) Students may not view confidential financial information sub-
mitted by their parents;6 9 and
(3) Students cannot gain access to their medical reports, although
they may engage an outside physician to examine the relevant
data with their consent.7 0
These stipulations largely satisfied the demands of educational authori-
ties.7 ' However, the provision that a student applying for admission, job
placement, or an award, can waive his right of access to confidential state-
ments72 might prove to be the Achilles heel of the new legislation. Although
66. Office of Senator Claiborne Pell, Press Release (Nov. 14, 1974).
67. S.J. Res. 40, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). For the conference committee's report
setting out the amendments to the original Buckley Amendment, see U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6794-97 (1975).
68. See White House Conference-Library and Information Services, Pub. L. No. 93-
568, § 2(a)(3), 88 Stat. 1855 (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2130
(1975)).
69. See id.
70. See id. § 2(a) (2) (F). This exception was accomplished by excluding such in-
formation from the legislative definition of the term "education records."
71. Signers of the memorandum, supra note 55, along with a representative of
the National Catholic Education Association, sent a telegram to President Ford
on December 19, 1974, strongly urging his approval of the new measure. They stressed
their view that if the legislation were not enacted it would "cause untold confusion on
every college campus in the nation."
72. Sectioa (2)(a)(3) of the corrective legislation provides for inclusion of the fol-
lowing paragraph:
A student or a person applying for admissions may waive his right of access
to confidential statements ...except that such waiver shall apply to recom-
mendations only if (i) the student is, upon request, notified of the names of
all persons making confidential recommendations and (ii) such recommenda-
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the conference changes included a provision that students cannot be required
to sign such a waiver, there exists a great possibility that a student will, in
a practical sense, be compelled to do so. 7 3
"Waiver" is usually defined as the voluntary relinquishment of a known
right. 74 The voluntariness of the act of waiver is often heralded as its most
essential characteristic. 75 Two themes in the area of waiver are of special
significance in a consideration of its application to the newly defined rights
of access to student files. First, in 1968 the Supreme Court stated that
"where there is coercion there cannot be consent. ' 76  Consent is, of course,
the essence of voluntary relinquishment. Second, judicial analysis of the
waiver of a right extended by statute will necessarily involve reference to the
legislative intent. Thus, "[w]here a private right is granted in the public in-
terest to effectuate a legislative policy, waiver of a right so charged or colored
with the public interest will not be allowed where it would thwart the legis-
lative policy which it was designed to effectuate. 7 7
It is unclear how or whether safeguards will evolve78 to prevent abuse of
tions are used solely for the purpose for which they were specifically intended.
Such waivers may not be required as a condition for admission to, receipt of
financial aid from, or receipt of any other services or benefits from such
agency or institution. (Emphasis added).
White House Conference-Library and Information Services, Pub. L. No. 93-568, § 2(a)
(3), 88 Stat. 1855 (U.S. CODE CONG. & A. NEWS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2136 (1975)).
73. The United States Student Association opposed the waiver, feeling that students
would be "subtly coerced" into waiving their right of access. Interview with Kathy
Kelly, President of the United States Student Association, in Washington, D.C., Decem-
ber 15, 1974.
74. See, e.g., Cornell, Howland, Hayes & Merryfield, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co.,
465 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Slaughter, 366 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1966);
Women's Catholic Order of Foresters v. City of Ennis, 116 F.2d 270 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 589 (1941); B-M-G Inv. Co. v. Continental/Moss-Gordin, Inc., 320
F. Supp. 968 (D. Tex. 1969); Hove v. Atchison, 138 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.D.), aff'd, 238
F.2d 819 (8th Civ. 1956).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Provision Co., 294 F. Supp. 385 (D. Del.
1968); Nichols v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 157 F. Supp. 554 (D. Md. 1957), rev'd, 256 F.2d
521 (4th Cir. 1958). See also 56 AM. JUR. Waiver §§ 2, 12 (1947).
76. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968). See also United States
v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 77 (2d Cir. 1973).
77. Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945).
78. Waiver of fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment rights in the criminal context has
undergone, in recent years, the imposition of important procedural safeguards. Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is the leading case in this area. It involved the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and the Court held that when there has
been custodial interrogation of a defendant, the prosecution must demonstrate "the use
of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination."
Id. at 444. See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); United States v. Gaines,
441 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966);
Comment, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L.
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the waiver provision. Turning to the current realities of educational record-
keeping, one notes that many large colleges and universities have in recent
years instituted reference services to cope with the exponential growth in stu--
dent requests for letters of recommendation from individual professors. Af-
ter receiving a professor's original recommendation, the service sends out
copies according to the student's request.
A brief study79 shows that recommendations prepared by various school
reference services since enactment of the original legislation are often ac-
companied by stipulations such as, "This material is released with the candi-
date's consent ... [IT] SHOULD NOT BE SHOWN TO OR DISCUSSED
WITH THE CANDIDATE""0 or, "This information is strictly confidential.
Under no circumstances should it be shown or given to the candidate" 8' or,
"References are CONFIDENTIAL and are NOT to be shown to the candi-
date under any circumstances. '8 2 Only a few forms, of approximately thirty
surveyed, appeared to comply with the intent and letter of the Act.83 Par-
ticularly distressing were packets accompanied by printed form letters, one
REV. 130 (1967). It is unclear, however, if similarly evolved safeguards will operate
in regard to a right extended by statute, as in the present case.
79. Schools surveyed included Barnard, Boise State, Boston College, Bucknell, Col-
gate, College of Human Ecology at Cornell University, Douglass, Duke, Georgetown,
Mount Holyoke, New Rochelle, Northeastern, St. Joseph's (Philadelphia, Pa.), Smith,
State University of New York at Buffalo, State University College at New Paltz, State
University of New York at Stony Brook, Syracuse University, Temple, Tufts, University
of California at Berkeley, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, University of
Maryland, University of Massachusetts, University of New Hampshire, University of
Pennsylvania, University of Rochester, University of Virginia, University of Virginia
Law School, Wellesley, and Yale. Survey conducted by the author, Dec. 1974-Jan. 1975.
80. Placement Form, State University of New York at Buffalo.
81. Placement Form, Colgate University. In a recent communication, the Assistant
to the Dean of Students admitted to a "lag in changing our forms and procedures," but
stated that provisions such as this "are now being modified or deleted as the law re-
quires." Letter from Gary Pavela to the author, Feb. 26, 1975.
82. Placement Form, Mount Holyoke College. The college's Director of Vocational
Planning and Placement avers that after November 11, 1974, the school "started operat-
ing on the assumption that thereafter recommendations would be open to the individual
at her request." The Director admitted to confusion about the current waiver provision:
"How waivers will or can be handled is still unclear--especially since they cannot be
required-and, quite frankly, we are still debating policy and procedures in regard to
these." Letter from Drue E. Matthews to the author, Feb. 27, 1975.
83. The model among these was that of Bucknell:
The accompanying personally identifiable student information has been re-
leased with the written consent of the said Bucknell student who has been given
the opportunity to review this information and receive a copy before its release.
In compliance with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974,
this information is released only on condition that the recipient will not per-
mit any other party to have access to such information without the written con-
sent of the student.
1975]
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stating that "the recommendations contained herein have been acquired with
a waiver of right of inspection by the subject,"'8 4 and another stating that the
"student has signed a waiver of his legal rights, a copy of which is enclosed." 85
As some of the forms were prepared prior to passage of the new legislation,
it would be inaccurate to state that there exists substantial noncompliance
at present. However, it is clear that avoidance of the original legislation was
accomplished by the majority of surveyed schools, before and after the ef-
fective date of November 19, 1974. Further, despite the new Act's provision
that waiver cannot be a condition of obtaining letters of recommendation, the
practice of including form letters with recommendation packets raises the pos-
sibility that larger colleges and universities will continue to treat the waiver
of the legal right of access in a relatively haphazard, or perhaps coercive,
manner.
How students should deal with coercive attempts at securing waivers will
depend largely on whether or not HEW takes an active role in investigating
alleged abuses. There now exists a special office at HEW which was set up
for the purpose of processing complaints and information requests.88 In ad-
dition, HEW issued comments on January 6, 1975, regarding the new legis-
lation.87 The comment on the waiver provision substantially restates the
statutory language,88 but an introductory letter from the Secretary of HEW
suggests that some "new issues" have been raised in response to which new
rules may be developed.89
III. CONCLUSION
The actions of HEW in enforcing compliance with the Buckley Amend-
ment will be a crucial indicator of the government's desire and ability to ex-
tend the spirit of the recently evolved privacy laws into the classroom. Al-
though conceived, passed, and enacted in a somewhat unconventional man-
84. Placement Form, University of Virginia. The Director of Career Planning and
Placement reports, however, that students may opt for either an "open" or a "closed"
file. If they choose the latter, the cited provision is included with their recommendation
packet. "Almost all of our registrants," wrote the Director, "elect the 'closed' system
and execute a waiver to this effect." Letter from Lawrence A. Simpson to the author,
Feb. 12, 1975.
85. Placement Form, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign.
86. See HEW News, November 18, 1974, at 1.
87. See 40 Fed. Reg. 1208 (1975).
88. "Since an educational institution is precluded from 'effectively' preventing the ex-
ercise of access rights. . . an institution could not require students to waive such rights.
However . . . students [are allowed] to waive their rights under certain conditions."
Id. at 1212.
89. See id. at 1209.
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